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Towards Model-Based Model of Cognition
In data mining, people are working (sometimes 
- with almost no theory behind) with a variety 
of computer models that are extremely useful in 
practice,  but  hardly  resemble  their  target 
objects.  "All models are wrong, but some are 
useful." - as put by the statistician George E. P. 
Box (1979:  Robustness  in  the  strategy  of 
scientific  model  building.  Robustness  in  
statistics, 201-236).
This wide experience with "theory-less, wrong 
and useful" models is  provoking three radical 
ideas.  None  of  them  is  completely  new,  the 
novelty  might  be  the  composition  proposed 
below: let's consider philosophy of all kinds of 
cognition,  and  try  a  completely  model-based 
rewriting of it.
The first idea: internally, there is no difference 
between  "true"  models  and  "wrong"  models. 
Mainly, we do not know in advance (sometimes 
- for centuries), which parts of our models or 
theories are true, and which are not. Sometimes 
we know that our model is  "wrong" in  many 
respects,  but  it  remains  useful,  nevertheless. 
Many  people  may  continue  believing  in  an 
overthrown model or theory for a long time - 
and  continue  acting  accordingly.  Hence,  the 
somewhat  paradoxical  term  -  "wrong" 
knowledge.  This  corresponds  well  to  "The 
Dappled  World"  picture  (Nancy  Cartwright), 
see  Paul  Teller (2004:  How  We  Dapple  the 
World, Philosophy of Science, 71(4): 425-447). 
Thus, for the philosophy of cognition, "wrong" 
knowledge should be as prominent a subject as  
the "true" knowledge.
And, if we wish to answer non-trivial questions 
like as "Is it true that quarks really exist?", then 
our philosophy of cognition shouldn't introduce  
the  notion  of  "truth"  too  early,  as  something 
primary,  and  therefore  -  mystical.  Truth  is 
emerging later - on top of cognition, it doesn't 
reside  at  the  bottom  of  it.  We  can  derive 
ontologies  and  truths  only  by  analyzing 
invariants of a successful model evolution - as I 
tried to propose in "Is Scientific Modeling an 
Indirect Methodology?" (The Reasoner 3(1): 4-
5).
In  terms  of  theories,  a  similar  idea  was 
proposed as  the “Deepening Maxim” by  Paul 
Thagard (2007:  Coherence,  truth,  and  the 
development  of  scientific  knowledge. 
Philosophy of Science,74, 28-47): "If a theory 
not only maximizes explanatory coherence, but 
also broadens its evidence base over time and is 
deepened by explanations of why the theory’s 
proposed  mechanism  works,  then  we  can 
reasonably conclude that the theory is at least 
approximately true." (41). And by Jeffrey Alan 
Barrett (2008:  Approximate  Truth  and 
Descriptive  Nesting.  Erkenntnis 68(2):  213-
224)  -  as  "a  notion  of  local  probable 
approximate  truth  in  terms  of  descriptive 
nesting  relations  between  current  and 
subsequent theories" (213).
The  second  idea:  models  are  the  ultimate 
results of all (scientific, non-scientific, and anti-
scientific)  kinds  of  cognition.  Therefore, 
philosophy of  cognition  should  start  with  the 
following  fundamental  distinction:  there  are 
models, and there are means of model-building.  
Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a 
means  of  model-building  -  "The  Toolbox  of 
Science" -  as put  by  Mauricio Suarez,  Nancy 
Cartwright  (2008:  Theories:  Tools  versus 
Models.  Studies in History and Philosophy of  
Modern Physics, 39: 62-81).
The third idea: to cover all kinds of cognition, 
the  notion  of  model  should  be  defined  as 
broadly as possible: a model is anything that is  
(or could be) used, for some purpose, in place 
of  something  else. To  put  it  somewhat 
paradoxically: models are tiny fragments of the 
Universe possibly usable (for some purpose) in 
place of other fragments (or, even in place of 
the  entire  Universe).  Mathematical  models, 
fictional  worlds,  mental  structures  and 
processes are included here, of course. 
Among  philosophers,  this  broadest  possible 
notion  of  model  was  stated  by  Paul  Teller 
(2001:  Twilight  of  the  Perfect  Model  Model. 
Erkenntnis,  55:  393–415).  But,  among 
computer  scientists,  it  can  be  traced  back  to 
Marvin  Minsky (1965:  Matter,  Mind  and 
Models.  Proceedings of  IFIP Congress 65,  1: 
45-49).
Minsky applies the notion of model in a way, 
that  is  very  natural  from computer  scientist's 
point  of  view,  but  seems  not  very  popular 
among philosophers. I would put this  "robotic 
ontology" as follows:
In my head,  I have a model of the world (an 
incomplete one, incoherent, inconsistent, in part 
-  fictional,  containing  all  my  knowledge, 
beliefs, dreams etc.). And I'm acting according 
to this model. In this model, other persons are 
believed to have their own models of the world 
(in some respects - different from my model). 
And they are acting according to their models. I 
may know these models  more or less,  and in 
this  way  I  can  predict  -  to  some  extent  - 
people's behavior. Thus, my model of the world 
may contain "models of models" - for example, 
a simplified model of your model of the world.
And, to complete the picture: how about model-
building  in  philosophy?  Perhaps,  many  will 
agree  with  Peter  Godfrey  Smith (2006: 
Theories  and  Models  in  Metaphysics.  The 
Harvard Review of Philosophy, XIV: 4-19): "... 
much  metaphysical  work,  especially  of  the 
contemporary  systematic  kind,  might  best  be 
understood  as  model-building,  ..."  (4). 
However, "It would be foolish to suppose that 
such  a  hypothesis  could  be  applied  to  all 
metaphysical discussion, but it might be true of 
an  important  part  of  the  field."  (5).  But  how 
about trying this "foolish" step?
If none of the above theses is completely new, 
then - what is missing? My general impression: 
despite  many  brilliant  insights,  generated  by 
philosophers  for  many  years,  the  field 
(philosophy  of  cognition)  remains  unordered 
for too long a time. For example, according to 
the  account  given  by  Roman  Frigg,  Stephan 
Hartmann (2006:  Models in Science.  Stanford 
Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy),  there  is  still  no 
generally  acknowledged  unified  notion  of 
model.  Or, according to the account given by 
Eric  Schwitzgebel (2006:  Belief.  Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy), there are several 
competing approaches to explaining "what is it 
to  believe".  Couldn't  these  complications  be 
caused by the idea of "propositional attitude" - 
the idea that separate propositions are believed 
in, and not entire models, theories, or fragments 
of them?
If it's true that models are the ultimate results of 
cognition, then shouldn't we try reordering the 
field, starting with the notion of model? In this 
way,  couldn't  we  obtain  a  unified  and  more 
productive  picture  -  a  model-based  model  of 
cognition?
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